The History of Stablecoins: Twelve Years of Growth and Crisis

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In October 2014, Tether Limited launched a token called Realcoin, later renamed Tether (USDT), on the Bitcoin blockchain. Tether backed each token one-to-one with US dollars held in a bank account. That launch marked the beginning of a new category of digital assets. Over the next 12 years, stablecoins became one of the most debated and closely watched sectors in digital finance.

Today, stablecoins account for $316 billion in circulation, process $28 trillion in quarterly volume, and operate under a federal regulatory framework in the United States. Along the way, the market experienced a $40 billion collapse, a banking crisis, years of regulatory disputes, and the passage of the most important stablecoin legislation in crypto’s history.

Bitcoin, Ethereum, and most other cryptocurrencies are highly volatile. Their prices can change significantly over short periods, making them attractive investments but unreliable for everyday payments. Stablecoins emerged to solve that problem.

A trader may want to exit a volatile position without transferring funds to a traditional bank account. A DeFi user may want to earn yield without taking on the price risk of a specific cryptocurrency. Someone living in a country with a weak local currency may want access to US dollars without opening a US bank account. Although their needs differ, they all need an asset that settles on a blockchain while maintaining a stable value.

Stablecoins meet that need. They are digital tokens that maintain a one-to-one peg with the US dollar or another reference asset. As a result, they combine the speed, accessibility, and programmability of blockchain networks with the price stability of traditional money.

Market Adoption

Stablecoins grew from a niche tool for crypto traders into a global market. Today, traders, DeFi participants, cross-border payment users, businesses settling international invoices, and institutional investors all use stablecoins to manage and transfer dollar-denominated value on blockchain networks.

The history of stablecoins is also the history of competing approaches to maintaining a stable price. Each model balances simplicity, transparency, capital efficiency, and resilience differently.

Three models reached meaningful scale. Fiat-backed stablecoins hold cash or cash-equivalent reserves and issue tokens against those reserves. Crypto-collateralized stablecoins lock more cryptocurrency than they issue in value, using excess collateral to absorb price swings. Algorithmic stablecoins rely on software and market incentives instead of collateral to maintain their peg.

The outcomes have been very different. Fiat-backed stablecoins became the dominant model. Crypto-collateralized stablecoins established a lasting role despite their complexity. Algorithmic stablecoins collapsed in 2022, wiping out more than $40 billion in value and changing how the industry and regulators viewed the sector.

This article traces the history of all three models, explains why some designs succeeded while others failed, and analyzes how those outcomes led to today’s regulatory framework and the modern stablecoin market.

The Three Models: How Stablecoins Maintain Their Peg

2014: Three Experiments Launch Simultaneously

2014

BitUSD, NuBits, and Realcoin: Three Competing Designs

Three stablecoins launched in 2014, each with a different approach to maintaining a stable value. BitUSD launched on the BitShares blockchain on July 21 as the first crypto-collateralized stablecoin. NuBits followed in September with an algorithmic, seigniorage-based model. In October, Tether Limited launched Realcoin on the Omni layer built on Bitcoin, introducing the fiat-backed model that still dominates the market.

The timing was not a coincidence. Different teams reached the same conclusion: crypto needed a stable unit of value. Each team proposed a different solution, and the results over the following decade revealed the strengths and weaknesses of each model.

The Three Projects

BitUSD, created by Dan Larimer on the BitShares blockchain, introduced the crypto-collateralized model. Users locked BitShares (BTS) tokens as collateral and received BitUSD in return. The system functioned as intended, with collateral and liquidation mechanisms protecting the peg. However, adoption remained largely limited to the BitShares ecosystem. As the platform lost relevance, BitUSD also lost its peg and eventually faded from the market.

NuBits introduced an algorithmic approach. The protocol issued new NuBits when demand increased and bought them back when demand declined. The model relied on market confidence rather than collateral. It repeatedly lost its dollar peg during periods of market stress and ultimately failed, providing one of the earliest examples of the limits of algorithmic stablecoins without sufficient reserves.

Realcoin, renamed Tether (USDT) in November 2014, adopted the simplest design. The company held US dollars in reserve and issued digital tokens against those reserves. That model proved far more durable than its competitors. Over time, USDT expanded from the Omni layer to Ethereum, Tron, and many other blockchain networks. By 2026, it remained the world’s largest stablecoin by circulating supply despite years of scrutiny over its reserves, including a $41 million settlement with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in October 2021.

Tether: The Dominant and Contested Giant

Tether has played a larger role in the stablecoin market than any other issuer. It has also faced more scrutiny than any of its competitors. No other stablecoin has attracted as many regulatory investigations, generated as many questions about its reserves, or remained as dominant despite years of controversy.

In its early years, Tether claimed that every USDT was backed one-to-one by US dollars held in a bank account. Later investigations and legal proceedings found that this was not always the case. At different times, Tether’s reserves included commercial paper, loans to affiliated companies, including its sister exchange Bitfinex, and other assets that did not match its public statements about full dollar backing.

Regulatory Action and Reserves

Regulators took action in October 2021. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) fined Tether and Bitfinex $41 million after finding that Tether had made false statements about its reserves and that both companies had violated U.S. commodities laws. As part of the settlement, Tether agreed to pay the penalty and stop making misleading claims about its reserves. However, the settlement did not require the company to stop operating or to hold its reserves exclusively in cash and US Treasury securities.

Since the 2021 settlement, Tether has reduced its commercial paper holdings and increased its allocation to US Treasury bills. Quarterly attestations by BDO show that the company’s reserves now rely much more heavily on Treasury bills and cash equivalents than they did in its early years. As of mid-2026, Tether reports about $120 billion in US Treasury bills and cash equivalents against roughly $187 billion in USDT in circulation.

USDT remains the world’s largest stablecoin, with approximately $187 billion in circulation, representing about 59% of the market. That level of concentration creates an important source of systemic risk for the crypto industry. A failure caused by reserve losses, regulatory action, or the collapse of a key banking partner could disrupt DeFi protocols, crypto trading, and cross-border payments that depend on USDT.

Tether (History of Stablecoins)

DAI and the Crypto-Collateralized Experiment (2017–Present)

December 2017

MakerDAO Launches DAI: The First Decentralized Stablecoin to Scale

MakerDAO, founded by Rune Christensen in 2015, spent two years building the smart contract system behind DAI. When the protocol launched single-collateral DAI (SAI) in December 2017, it became the first decentralized stablecoin to achieve meaningful adoption.

Unlike fiat-backed stablecoins, DAI did not rely on a company holding dollars in reserve. Instead, users locked ETH into smart contracts and minted DAI against that collateral. If the value of the collateral fell below the required threshold, the protocol automatically liquidated the position to protect the peg.

Multi-Collateral DAI (MCD) launched in November 2019, allowing users to back DAI with additional assets beyond ETH. The upgrade expanded the protocol’s flexibility while preserving its decentralized design.

Black Thursday

DAI faced its first major test on March 12, 2020, a day widely known as Black Thursday. ETH fell 43% in a single day, triggering widespread liquidations across MakerDAO vaults. However, as documented in our bear market psychology research, the biggest challenge was not the price decline but Ethereum network congestion. Gas fees climbed above 200 Gwei, preventing liquidation bots from submitting competitive bids during collateral auctions. As a result, some vaults were liquidated for zero DAI, exposing a critical weakness in the system during periods of extreme network stress.

MakerDAO responded by increasing liquidation penalties, adjusting collateral requirements, and adding safeguards to improve future auctions. DAI maintained its peg, but the event exposed the limits of crypto-collateralized stablecoins during periods of extreme market stress.

From Crypto Collateral to Real-World Assets

MakerDAO gradually broadened the assets backing DAI. In 2020, the protocol began accepting USDC as collateral, reducing its reliance on ETH while introducing exposure to centralized assets. It later added tokenized US Treasury securities, institutional loans, and other real-world assets.

By 2023, most of DAI’s backing no longer came from cryptocurrency alone. Instead, the protocol relied on a mix of crypto assets and traditional financial instruments.

In August 2023, MakerDAO rebranded as Sky and renamed DAI to USDS. The change reflected founder Rune Christensen’s Endgame restructuring plan and the protocol’s broader direction. By mid-2026, USDS had approximately $8.4 billion in circulation, below DAI’s peak of about $10 billion as demand shifted toward simpler fiat-backed stablecoins.

USDC: The Regulated Alternative (2018–Present)

USDC marked the next major chapter in the history of stablecoins. In 2018, Circle and Coinbase co-founded the Centre Consortium to launch a fully reserved stablecoin with regular reserve attestations. The strategy was deliberate. USDC positioned itself as the transparent alternative to Tether, giving institutional investors, regulators, and compliance-focused DeFi protocols a stablecoin without the reserve questions that had followed USDT.

USDC’s growth between 2020 and 2022 came largely from the rapid expansion of decentralized finance. As Ethereum’s DeFi ecosystem attracted more users and capital, protocols needed a stable asset for liquidity, collateral, and a unit of account. Circle’s reserve attestations from Deloitte, together with its relationships with US regulators, made USDC the preferred choice for protocols seeking greater regulatory certainty.

The Silicon Valley Bank Test

The biggest test of USDC’s fiat-backed model came in March 2023. Circle held approximately $3.3 billion of USDC’s reserve assets at Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). When the bank collapsed, USDC briefly fell as low as $0.87 on secondary markets.

The depeg did not expose a weakness in Circle’s reserve model. Instead, it highlighted a different type of risk. Fiat-backed stablecoins depend not only on their reserves but also on the stability of the banking system that holds those reserves. Circle recovered the full $3.3 billion after US regulators guaranteed all SVB deposits, allowing USDC to return to its dollar peg. The episode showed that even fully reserved stablecoins remain exposed to banking-sector disruptions.

Institutional Adoption

USDC continued to grow after the SVB depeg, reaching approximately $78 billion in circulating supply by mid-2026. During the first quarter of 2026, USDT’s circulating supply declined by roughly $3 billion, its first quarterly decline since 2022. Over the same period, USDC added about $2 billion, reaching $78 billion as institutional demand increasingly favored regulated stablecoins.

The contrast between USDC and USDT illustrates how the history of stablecoins has expanded beyond technology and into regulation. USDC aligns with the requirements of the GENIUS Act, while USDT continues to face questions about compliance with the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation. As institutional participation grows, regulatory compliance has become an increasingly important factor in stablecoin competition.

The TerraUSD Collapse: When $40 Billion Disappeared in 72 Hours (May 2022)

May 9–12, 2022

TerraUSD Loses Its Peg: The Largest Stablecoin Failure in History

TerraUSD (UST), created by Do Kwon and Terraform Labs, was the algorithmic stablecoin of the Terra ecosystem. It maintained its dollar peg through a mint-and-burn mechanism linked to LUNA, Terra’s native governance token. When UST traded above $1, users could burn LUNA to mint new UST, increasing supply and pushing the price back toward the peg. When UST traded below $1, users could burn UST to mint LUNA, reducing UST’s supply and supporting its price.

The model depended on confidence in LUNA. Its market capitalization needed to remain large enough to absorb UST redemptions because the arbitrage mechanism relied on LUNA retaining sufficient value.

TerraUSD grew into the world’s third-largest stablecoin, reaching a market capitalization of about $18 billion. However, in May 2022, the system unraveled within 72 hours. UST lost its dollar peg and fell close to zero, triggering a chain reaction that erased roughly $300 billion across the broader crypto market and severely damaged investor confidence.

The Death Spiral

The collapse followed the self-reinforcing cycle that critics of algorithmic stablecoins had long warned about. Large-scale selling pushed UST below $1. The protocol responded by encouraging users to redeem UST for newly minted LUNA. As more LUNA entered circulation, its price fell. The lower LUNA price meant the protocol had to mint even more LUNA to process the same amount of UST redemptions, creating even greater selling pressure.

The cycle quickly accelerated. Falling LUNA prices weakened confidence in the system, leading to more UST selling, more LUNA issuance, and further price declines. By May 12, LUNA had fallen from about $80 to fractions of a cent, while UST traded near $0.10. An ecosystem that had once been worth about $40 billion had almost entirely collapsed.

Do Kwon attempted to stabilize UST by deploying the Luna Foundation Guard’s Bitcoin reserve, worth about $3 billion at the time. The foundation sold Bitcoin to buy UST and defend the peg, but the effort failed. The additional Bitcoin selling added pressure to an already falling market without stopping UST’s collapse.

Kwon was later indicted in the United States on fraud charges for allegedly misleading investors about UST’s stability. He was arrested in Montenegro in March 2023, extradited to the United States in 2024, and Terraform Labs later reached a $4.5 billion settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over allegations that it misrepresented UST’s design.

As documented in our crypto scams research, some researchers classify TerraUSD’s collapse as a design failure because the death spiral was inherent to the algorithmic model. Others classify it as fraud because Terraform Labs misrepresented UST’s stability to investors. Both interpretations have merit. The design proved vulnerable during periods of market stress, while regulators argued that investors also received misleading information about the risks.

Regulatory Response

TerraUSD’s collapse changed the direction of stablecoin regulation around the world. Policymakers who had debated stablecoin oversight for years moved much more quickly after the collapse exposed the risks of algorithmic designs.

The GENIUS Act reflects that change. The law excludes algorithmic stablecoins from the definition of a payment stablecoin, preventing them from operating under the same federal regulatory framework available to qualifying fiat-backed stablecoins.

$40B

Value destroyed by TerraUSD’s collapse — May 2022

The $40 billion figure refers to the combined peak market capitalization of UST and LUNA. The estimated $300 billion decline across the broader crypto market includes the indirect effects of the collapse, including forced liquidations, institutional failures such as Three Arrows Capital and Celsius, and the loss of market confidence that followed. By value destroyed, TerraUSD remains the largest single failure in the history of stablecoins and the broader crypto industry.

The Stablecoin Regulation Journey: A Decade of Policy Change (2014–2025)

For most of their first decade, stablecoins operated in a regulatory gray area. FinCEN’s 2013 guidance on money services businesses (MSBs) technically applied to stablecoin issuers because entities that issue and redeem virtual currency tokens fall within the MSB definition. However, regulators devoted far more attention to crypto exchanges and initial coin offerings (ICOs) than to stablecoins.

TerraUSD’s collapse in May 2022 changed the conversation. The failure erased roughly $40 billion in value from a financial instrument promoted as stable. It also exposed the lack of reserve requirements, redemption standards, and issuer oversight for a market that had grown to approximately $18 billion. Stablecoin regulation quickly moved from a niche policy issue to a legislative priority.

Congress Takes Action

The legislative process took several years. The House passed a stablecoin bill in 2023, but it did not advance in the Senate. A bipartisan Senate bill followed in 2024 but stalled over disagreements about the balance between federal and state oversight.

The breakthrough came in 2025. The Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act passed the Senate by a vote of 68-30 and became law in July 2025. As covered in our crypto regulation research, the law established the first binding federal rules for payment stablecoins in the United States.

The GENIUS Act requires issuers to maintain qualifying reserves, obtain licenses, and comply with restrictions on interest payments. Issuers with more than $10 billion in outstanding stablecoins are supervised by the Federal Reserve. Smaller issuers may operate under state regulatory systems that meet federal minimum standards.

Reserve Requirements

The law also defines which assets may back payment stablecoins. Qualifying reserves include cash, insured bank deposits, Treasury bills with maturities of less than 93 days, and reserves held at the Federal Reserve. Commercial paper, corporate bonds, longer-duration government securities, and crypto assets do not qualify.

Those reserve requirements answer one of the key questions in the history of stablecoins: what assets should back a digital dollar? The law limits payment stablecoin reserves to highly liquid, low-risk assets, addressing many of the reserve quality concerns that surrounded Tether for years.

Global Regulation

Regulation has also advanced outside the United States. The European Union began fully enforcing the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation in December 2024, producing immediate effects across the stablecoin market. USDC achieved MiCA compliance and retained broad access to European markets. Tether’s compliance position has been less certain because MiCA imposes reserve and governance requirements that do not automatically align with the company’s historical practices.

The GENIUS Act and MiCA also treat algorithmic stablecoins differently. The GENIUS Act excludes them from the definition of a payment stablecoin, preventing them from operating under the federal rules created for fiat-backed issuers. Under MiCA, some algorithmic stablecoins that reference a single official currency may qualify as e-money tokens if they satisfy the regulation’s requirements.

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The New Entrants: PayPal, USD1, and the Institutional Wave

Clearer regulation under the GENIUS Act and the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation has encouraged a new generation of stablecoin issuers. Unlike the first wave of stablecoins, these entrants launched into a market with established regulatory expectations for reserves, licensing, and compliance.

New Issuers, New Use Cases

PayPal launched PYUSD through Paxos in August 2023, becoming the first major consumer financial company to issue its own stablecoin. With approximately 400 million active accounts worldwide, PayPal brought stablecoins to one of the largest existing digital payment networks. Although PYUSD remains much smaller than USDT and USDC, its long-term importance lies in the infrastructure behind it. Existing PayPal users can access a stablecoin without opening accounts on a crypto exchange or learning a new ecosystem.

USD1 is backed by cash, cash equivalents, and short-term US Treasury securities held by regulated custodians. BitGo Trust Company serves as the custodian for its reserve assets. Although USD1 remains much smaller than USDT and USDC, it has expanded quickly after being selected for several large tokenization and institutional settlement initiatives. Entities connected to the Trump family are associated with USD1, drawing additional public scrutiny. However, its reserve model aligns with the requirements of the GENIUS Act.

Institutional Adoption

The growing role of institutions has become one of the defining developments in the history of stablecoins. Banks are evaluating stablecoin issuance, sovereign wealth funds are using stablecoins for cross-border settlement, and corporations are adopting them for treasury management and supplier payments. That level of institutional participation was largely absent during the market’s first decade. Regulatory clarity under the GENIUS Act has given compliance teams a clearer legal basis for evaluating stablecoin use, opening the door to broader institutional adoption.

The $28 Trillion Quarterly Volume Story

Transaction volume provides the clearest picture of how stablecoins are used today. Stablecoins processed $28 trillion in transaction volume during the first quarter of 2026, a 51% increase from the previous quarter and the highest quarterly total on record. The figures show that stablecoins have moved beyond their original role in crypto trading and now function as a global payments network.

Beyond Market Capitalization

Annualized, that quarterly volume equals approximately $112 trillion. It exceeds the annual payment volume reported by Visa, Mastercard, and many other payment networks. The comparison, however, comes with important caveats. Stablecoin transaction volume includes substantial DeFi activity that does not represent consumer or business payments, and different methodologies produce different estimates. Even after adjusting for on-chain activity that remains within DeFi protocols, stablecoins operate at a scale that places them among the world’s largest payment systems rather than a niche segment of the crypto market.

An Expanding On-Chain Dollar Economy

As covered in our RWA tokenization research, tokenized US Treasuries have become an increasingly important part of the on-chain dollar economy. They now serve both as reserve assets for stablecoins and as yield-bearing alternatives to cash-backed stablecoins. As a result, stablecoins, tokenized government securities, and DeFi protocols are becoming more closely connected, creating financial relationships that traditional payment infrastructure cannot easily replicate.

$316B

Total stablecoin market capitalization (mid-2026)

$28T

Stablecoin transaction volume in Q1 2026 (all-time high)

The Market Structure in Mid-2026

By mid-2026, the history of stablecoins had entered a new phase. The market was more concentrated, more regulated, and more closely connected to institutional finance than at any earlier point. Total stablecoin market capitalization reached approximately $316 billion, with two issuers accounting for most of the market. Tether’s USDT represented about $187 billion, or 59% of total supply, while Circle’s USDC accounted for roughly $75 billion, or 24%. DAI/USDS, PYUSD, USD1, the remaining BUSD supply, and dozens of smaller issuers made up the remaining 17%.

Market Concentration

The market also recorded its first meaningful contraction in several years. Stablecoin supply declined by approximately $15 billion, the largest drop since TerraUSD’s collapse. The decline reflected both the broader weakness in crypto markets during the second quarter of 2026 and developments within the stablecoin market. USDT recorded its first quarterly decline since 2022, partly due to uncertainty over MiCA compliance in Europe and partly due to some institutional users shifting toward USDC’s more clearly regulated reserve model.

Global Dollar Adoption

The geographic distribution of stablecoin adoption tells an equally important story. Dollar-pegged stablecoins account for approximately 99% of the market, making stablecoins primarily a vehicle for global dollar access rather than a broad mix of digital currencies. Adoption has been strongest in countries with unstable local currencies. Nigeria, Turkey, Argentina, and Venezuela consistently rank among the leading markets because stablecoins provide access to US dollars where traditional banking services are limited or difficult to access.

As documented in our Crypto in Africa research, one of the strongest drivers of crypto adoption across Africa is access to US dollars and lower-cost cross-border payments. Stablecoins have become the primary tool for both. At the same time, the Lightning Network’s integration of USDT through Taproot Assets, as covered in our Lightning Network research, is expanding access to dollar-denominated payments in regions where banking infrastructure remains limited.

The Next Phase

Twelve years after the first stablecoins launched, the market looks very different. The GENIUS Act established federal rules for payment stablecoins in the United States. MiCA has changed competition across Europe. At the same time, stablecoins processed $28 trillion in transaction volume during the first quarter of 2026, confirming their role as global payments infrastructure. Yet the market also recorded its first meaningful contraction since 2022, raising questions about how regulation, banking relationships, and competition from tokenized Treasury products could affect future growth.

USDC and USDT

One question is how the balance between USDC and USDT develops over the coming years. Institutional demand has moved toward USDC, narrowing the gap with Tether’s market share. A move from the roughly 60/30 USDT-USDC split seen in 2022 toward a more balanced market, or even USDC leadership, would represent one of the biggest developments in the history of stablecoins since Tether established its dominance.

The GENIUS Act and MiCA both favor reserve transparency and regulatory compliance. If those conditions persist, they could strengthen USDC’s position among institutional users while increasing competitive pressure on USDT.

Yield-Bearing Stablecoins

Another question concerns yield-bearing stablecoins. The GENIUS Act prohibits payment stablecoins from paying interest to holders because lawmakers did not want them competing directly with bank deposits. Demand for yield-generating dollar assets on-chain is still strong. Tokenized Treasury products, DeFi lending markets, and issuers outside the United States each offer a different way to meet that demand. The direction the market takes will help define the next chapter in the history of stablecoins.

Tether’s Regulatory Position

A third question concerns Tether’s regulatory position. Tether has operated under regulatory scrutiny for more than a decade, paid a $41 million settlement to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and remained the world’s largest stablecoin throughout that period. The GENIUS Act now raises a new question: can Tether satisfy the law’s reserve requirements and reporting standards while keeping its market leadership?

If Tether complies with the GENIUS Act and retains its leading position, it would represent one of the biggest developments in the history of stablecoins. A company once criticized for its reserve disclosures would become part of the regulated financial system after spending years outside it. If Tether does not comply, and MiCA places additional pressure on its European business, USDC could gain further market share and alter the competitive balance of the stablecoin market.

Twelve Years Later

Realcoin launched on the Bitcoin blockchain in October 2014 as a token pegged to the US dollar. Twelve years later, stablecoins account for approximately $316 billion in circulation, process $28 trillion in quarterly transaction volume, and are subject to federal regulation in the United States.

The people behind the first stablecoin projects could not have predicted where the market would go. What began as three competing designs to solve crypto’s volatility problem has become a global financial market.

The history of stablecoins is no longer only the story of digital assets. It is also the story of how digital dollars became part of the financial system, and the next chapter is still being written.

Main Takeaways

Stablecoins now function as global payments infrastructure. Transaction volume reached $28 trillion during the first quarter of 2026, while total market capitalization stood at approximately $316 billion. At the same time, the market recorded its first meaningful contraction since 2022 as MiCA compliance questions and growing institutional demand for USDC changed competition across the stablecoin market.

Three stablecoin models appeared in 2014. BitUSD was the first crypto-collateralized stablecoin; NuBits used an algorithmic design, and Realcoin, later renamed Tether, adopted the fiat-backed model. Over the next 12 years, the fiat-backed model became the dominant design, the crypto-collateralized model secured a lasting place in the market, and the algorithmic model collapsed after TerraUSD failed in 2022.

Tether holds the largest share of the stablecoin market despite years of regulatory scrutiny. USDT accounts for approximately $187 billion in circulation, representing about 59% of the market. A 2021 CFTC settlement found that Tether had made untrue statements about its reserves. Since then, the company has reduced its commercial paper holdings and increased its holdings of US Treasury bills and cash equivalents. Its size makes it one of the largest sources of systemic risk in the stablecoin market.

DAI demonstrated that decentralized stablecoins could operate at scale. MakerDAO launched DAI in December 2017. It survived Black Thursday in March 2020, when ETH fell 43%, and Ethereum network congestion disrupted liquidations. The protocol later accepted USDC and real-world assets as collateral before rebranding DAI to USDS under Sky Protocol.

TerraUSD became the largest failure in the history of stablecoins. The collapse erased about $40 billion in value within 72 hours and exposed the limits of algorithmic stablecoins that relied on market incentives instead of collateral. The failure accelerated regulatory action around the world and directly influenced the GENIUS Act’s decision to exclude algorithmic stablecoins from its payment stablecoin rules.

The GENIUS Act established the first federal rules for payment stablecoins in the United States. Signed into law in July 2025, it requires qualifying reserves, issuer licensing, and regular reserve attestations while excluding algorithmic stablecoins. In Europe, the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation established a separate set of compliance requirements across the European Union.


Sources & Further Reading

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